

# Subpart 904.70 - Facility Clearance

Parent topic: PART 904 - ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

## 904.7000 Scope of subpart.

This subpart sets forth the Department of Energy policies and procedures regarding Facility Clearances for contractors and subcontractors that require access to classified information or special nuclear material. A Facility Clearance is based upon a determination that satisfactory safeguards and security measures are carried out for classified activities being performed at the facility and upon a favorable foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI) determination.

## 904.7001 Applicability.

The provisions of this subpart shall apply to all offeror(s), contractors, and subcontractors who will or do have access to classified information or a significant quantity of special nuclear material.

## 904.7002 Definitions.

*Contract* means the prime contract and the subcontract at any tier.

*Contracting officer* means the DOE contracting officer.

*Contractor* means the contractor and the subcontractor at any tier.

*Facility clearance* means an administrative determination that a facility is eligible to access, produce, use, or store classified information, or special nuclear material.

*Foreign interest* means any of the following -

- (1) Foreign government or foreign government agency or instrumentality thereof;
- (2) Any form of business enterprise organized under the laws of any country other than the United States or its possessions;
- (3) Any form of business enterprise organized or incorporated under the laws of the U.S., or a State or other jurisdiction within the U.S. which is owned, controlled, or influenced by a foreign government, agency, firm, corporation, or person; or
- (4) Any person who is not a U.S. citizen.

*Foreign ownership, control, or influence* means the situation where the degree of ownership, control, or influence over an offeror(s) or a contractor by a foreign interest is such that a reasonable basis exists for concluding that compromise of classified information or special nuclear material may possibly result.

*Special nuclear material* means special nuclear material as defined in 10 CFR 710.5(a).

## **904.7003 Disclosure of foreign ownership, control, or influence.**

(a) If a contract requires a contractor to have a Facility Clearance, DOE must determine whether the contractor is or may be subject to foreign ownership, control or influence before a contract can be awarded.

(b) If, during the performance of a contract, the contractor comes under FOCI, then the DOE must determine whether a continuation of the Facility Clearance may pose an undue risk to the common defense and security through the possible compromise of that information or material. If the DOE determines that such a threat or potential threat exists, the contracting officer shall consider the alternatives of negotiating an acceptable method of isolating the foreign interest which owns, controls, or influences the contractor or terminating the contract.

(c) It is essential for the DOE to obtain information about FOCI which is sufficient to help the Department determine whether award of a contract to a person or firm, or the continued performance of a contract by a person or firm, may pose undue risk to the common defense and security. Therefore, the provision specified at 952.204-73 Facility Clearance, shall be included in solicitations that involve offeror(s) or contractors that are subject to 904.7001.

(d) The contracting officer shall not award or extend any contract subject to this subpart, exercise any options under a contract, modify any contracts subject to this subpart, or approve or consent to a subcontract subject to this subpart unless -

(1) The contractor provides the information required by the solicitation provision at 952.204-73 Facility Clearance, and

(2) The contracting officer has made a positive determination in accordance with 904.7004.

## **904.7004 Findings, determination, and contract award or termination.**

(a) Based on the information disclosed by the offeror(s) or contractor, and after consulting with the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, the contracting officer must determine that award of a contract to an offeror(s) or continued performance of a contract by a contractor will not pose an undue risk to the common defense and security. The contracting officer need not prepare a separate finding and determination addressing FOCI; however, the memorandum of negotiation shall include a discussion of the applicability of this subpart and the resulting determination.

(b) In those cases where FOCI does exist, and the DOE determines that an undue risk to the common defense and security may exist, the offeror(s) or contractor shall be requested to propose within a prescribed period of time a plan of action to avoid or mitigate the foreign influences by isolation of the foreign interest.

(c) The types of plans that a contractor can propose are: measures which provide for physical or

organizational separation of the facility or organizational component containing the classified information or special nuclear material; modification or termination of agreements with foreign interests; diversification or reduction of foreign source income; assignment of specific security duties and responsibilities to board members or special executive level committees; or any other actions to negate or reduce FOCI to acceptable levels. The plan of action may vary with the type of foreign interest involved, degree of ownership, and information involved so that each plan must be negotiated on a case by case basis. If the offeror(s) or contractor and the DOE cannot negotiate a plan of action that isolates the offeror(s) or contractor from FOCI satisfactory to the DOE, then the offeror(s) shall not be considered for contract award and affected existing contracts with a contractor shall be terminated.